Lessons from history (3 of series)

I found a fantastic and interesting example of what I was explaining in the previous posts of this series regarding the importance of learning history, but not assuming that every current situation is exactly like the one faced in past historic times. I pointed out that this is why military academies teach the famous personages, battles and wars to learn the common “wisdom” of the battlefield, but how the general on the ground has to make unique decisions, holding all that knowledge in mind. Here is an example from Grant’s Memoirs. It also demonstrates the great courtesy, even when military commanders disagree and is also another demonstration of the great fairness with which Grant dealt with his superiors, peers and subordinates, and also the enemy soldiers and civilians, both at the time and in later reminiscence. The timing is before the conversations with Lincoln that I previously cited, so Grant was not yet in charge of the entire force of the Union armies, but was in command of one of the armies of vital importance. The setting is Vicksburg, Mississippi, where Grant has attempted a military action to seize the city and having been repelled by the strongly ensconced Confederate defenders, and viewing the casualties as too high for no result, Grant now decides to conduct a siege of the hill and river protected Vicksburg.

This last attack only served to increase our casualties without giving any benefit whatever. As soon as it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy’s line and been obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thus ended the last assault upon Vicksburg.

I now determined upon a regular siege-to “out-camp the enemy,” as it were, and to incur no more losses. The experience of the 22d convinced officers and men tat this was the best, and they went to work on the defenses and approaches with a will. With the navy holding the river, the investment of Vicksburg was complete. As long as we could hold our position the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions of war to what they had on hand. These could not last always.

[Grant now writes about the specifics of the battles that are fought around the siege city, the casualties each side receives, and his tactics. It’s great reading, modest and honest, with insight into the conditions of the troops and the countryside along with the progress of the war. Among the government and military personnel who came to review progress was General Sherman. Sherman had previously criticized Grant’s plans, even kicking his objections up the chain of command, and that is the part I except and highlight for you readers now.]

There was a little knot around Sherman and another around me, and I heard Sherman repeating, in the most animated manner, what he had said to me when we first looked down from Walnut Hills upon the land below on the 18th of May, adding: “Grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; I opposed it. I wrote a letter about it.” But for this speech it is not likely that Sherman’s opposition would have ever been heard of. His untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitle him to a full share of all the credit due for its success. He could not have done more if the plan had been his own.

[Grant then footnotes an explanation of Sherman’s letter as follow.]

Note.-When General Sherman first learned of the move I proposed to make, he called to see me about it. I recollect that I had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river to a house a short distance back from the levee. I was seated on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when Sherman came up. After a few moments’ conversation he said that he would like to see me alone. We passed into the house together and shut the door after us. Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move I had ordered, saying that I was putting myself in a position voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to maneuver a year-or a long time-to get me in. I was going into the enemy’s country, with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points strongly fortified above and below. He said that it was an axiom in war that when any great boy of troops moved against an enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. He pointed out all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to make. This was, in substance, to go back until high ground could be established on the east bank of the river; fortify there and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. I said this would take us back to Memphis. Sherman then said that was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad from Memphis to Grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. To this I replied, the country is already disheartened over the lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout most of the North and conscription [“the draft”] was already resorted to, and if we went back so far as Memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of supplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them nor supplies to put in them would be furnished. The problem for us was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause would be lost. No progress was being made in any other field, and we had to go on.

Sherman wrote to my adjutant-general, Colonel J. A. Rawlins, embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals upon the subject. Colonel Rawlins showed me the letter, but I did not see any reason for changing my plans. The letter was not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned between Sherman and myself to the end of the war, that I remember of. I did not regard the letter as official, and consequently did not preserve it. General Sherman furnished a copy himself to General Badeau, who printed it in his history of my campaigns. I did not regard either the conversation between us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply friendly advice which the relations between us fully justified. Sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered by himself. I make this statement here to correct an impression which was circulated at the close of the war to Sherman’s prejudice [meaning being against Grant’s battle plans], and for which there was no fair foundation.

What is so important to notice is that once Sherman raised his concerns, and Grant goes ahead with his battle plans, Sherman threw his support into Grant’s military actions as vigorously as if he had thought of the plan himself. I think today’s military people and government officials should make note of this. Military folks tend to still be this way, but when I see an exception, particularly when it is acted out in Congress; it is disgraceful and painful to see. Even when legislators and government officials eventually agree on one plan, “one side wins,” I see a deliberate lukewarm support for the other “side,” even though, obviously, they are both serving the country’s business. Sherman worried that this decisive battle would be lost, due to Grant not following the standard axioms of war, yet when Grant went ahead, Sherman threw himself into making it every success as if it was his own plan and, as you see, never a word was spoken in public that there was even a disagreement. How unlike this example is compared to just about everything today.

[Vicksburg, as history records, was one of Grant’s greatest victories and was a turning point in the war. Vicksburg surrendered to Grant in July. Here is a great snapshot of what it was like during the siege, when there was not battle or skirmishing taking place.]

During the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were close together. All rebels were known as “Johnnies,” all Union troops as “Yanks.” Often “Johnny” would call: “Well, Yank, when are you coming into town?” The reply was sometimes: “We propose to celebrate the 4th of July there.” Sometimes it would be: “We always treat our prisoners with kindness and do not want to hurt them;” or, “We are holding you as prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves.” The garrison, from the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the fourth. They knew from the temper of their men it would be successful when made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. Besides it would be attended to with severe loss to them.

The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of the rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in speaking of the “Yankee” boast that they would take dinner in Vicksburg that day, that the best receipt for cooking a rabbit was, “First ketch your rabbit.” [For my readers who don’t speak native English, “ketch” is “catch” said with a Southern country accent.] The paper at this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side of wall paper. The last number was issued on the fourth and announced that we had “caught our rabbit.”

I rode into Vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. At that time I found that many of the citizens had been living under ground. The ridges upon which Vicksburg is built, and those back to the Big Black, are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity. .. Many citizens secured places of safety for their families by carving out rooms in these embankments… In these the occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were dropped into the city night and day without intermission…

This news, with the victory at Gettysburg won the same day, lifted a great load of anxiety from the minds of the President, his Cabinet and the loyal people all over the North. The fate of the Confederacy was sealed when Vicksburg fell. Much hard fighting was to be done afterwards and may precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the morale was with the supporters of the Union ever after.

I at the same time wrote to General Banks informing him of the fall and sending him a copy of the terms; also saying I would send him all the troops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemy now had on the Mississippi River…

Steele and Ord were directed to be in readiness to join Sherman in his move against General Johnston, and Sherman was advised of this also. Sherman moved promptly, crossing the Big Black at three different points with as many columns, all concentrating at Bolton, twenty miles west of Jackson. Johnson heard of the surrender of Vicksburg almost as soon as it occurred, and immediately fell back on Jackson…Johnson destroyed the roads as he passed and had so much the start that pursuit was useless; but Sherman sent on division, Steele’s, to Brandon, fourteen miles east of Jackson…Medicines and food were left for the Confederate wounded and sick who had to be left behind…

Medicine and food were also sent to Raymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as I thought it only fair that we should return to these people some of the articles we had taken while marching through the country. I wrote to Sherman: “Impress upon the men the importance of going through the State in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutely necessary for their subsistence while travelling. They should try to create as favorable an impression as possible upon the people.” Provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all the people, from Bruinsburg to Jackson and back to Vicksburg, whose resources had been taken for the supply of our army. Very large quantities of groceries and provisions were so issued…

I also detached a brigade under Ransom to Natchez, to garrison that place permanently. This latter move was quite fortunate as to the time when Ransom arrived there. The enemy happened to have a large number, about 5,000 head, of beef cattle there on the way from Texas to feed the Eastern armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which had probably come through Texas from the Rio Grande, and which were on the way to Lee’s and other armies in the East.